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Weick 1993 - The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations - The Mann Gulch Disaster

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Weick, K. E. (1993). The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann Gulch disaster. Administrative science quarterly, 628-652.

Summary

This paper examines the historical account of the tragic Mann Gulch fire (incidentally, I’ve read Young Men and Fire and recommend it). The sudden appearance and growth of the fire is characterized as a cosmology episode, which “occurs when people suddenly and deeply feel that the universe is no longer a rational, orderly system.” Page 635 provides a list of nine occurrences that seemed to make no sense. Of particular note were the foreman’s move away from the river (which was presumed safe - #5), the order to drop tools (#6), and the foreman’s direction to stop running (in the face of an oncoming fire) and join him (#7-8). The author states that cosmology episodes do not result in clarity, they result in confusion. Confusion lead to role collapse, and role collapse lead to panic.

Four different sources of resilience in the face cosmology episodes are discussed. First, practicing improvisation would’ve better prepared the firemen to deal with an unforeseen threat. Instead, their culture was one of rigid boundaries. The foreman’s sudden creative realization (to build an “escape fire”) was so alien that firefighters thought he had gone crazy. Norming creativity and improvisation, especially by leader modeling, would help create a more flexible culture. Bricolage refers to making something out of the materials at hand (i.e., Macgyvering). It is one example of creative problem solving.

The team became separated, and so the system of roles collapsed. The author says that, in that case, virtual role systems could be used. Being aware of the roles and responsibilities would allow a person to begin to step into those roles and fulfill those responsibilities. “Furthermore, people can run the group in their head and use it for continued guidance of their own individual action.”

The team thought that the fire was not as severe as it was. Wisdom is not just knowing, but knowing what you don’t know. It is neither “extreme confidence” or “extreme caution.” There is a healthy understanding that one’s understanding is not exhaustive or complete. This view of wisdom allows for constant reappraisal of developing situations, as opposed to definite closure (see need for closure).

Finally, respectful interaction on a team is a must. This does not just mean being polite (which can fire - see the author’s example of “devices of mitigation”), but knowing when to be direct. It also seems to imply a respect for roles, especially allowing leaders to lead. In this sense, it seems close to psychological safety.

Application

The part of this that really sticks out to me is when the foreman (who was relatively unknown) told the firefighters to drop their tools and to join him as he lay down in the ashes of a fire he had started. This would seem crazy. It takes a lot to build the kind of trust that would encourage someone to follow you - even if you seemed crazy. Unfortunately, it was just that type of critical trust that was lacking.

This post is licensed under CC BY 4.0 by the author.

Watson 1989 - Health complaints, stress, and distress - exploring the central role of negative affectivity

Weick 2005 - Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking

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